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 "In
Rome the army was the nation: no citizen could take office unless he
had served in ten campaigns. All spoke the same language, all were
inspired by the same ambition. The officers were often small farmers
like the men, but this civil equality produced no ill effects; the
discipline was most severe. It was a maxim that the soldier should fear
his officer more than he feared his foe. The drill was unremitting;
when they were in winter quarters they erected sheds in which the
soldiers fenced with swords cased in leather with buttons at the point
and hurled javelins, also buttoned, at one another. These foils were
double the weight of the weapons that were actually used. When the
day�s march was over they took pick-axe and spade, and built their camp
like a town with a twelve-foot stockade around it, and a ditch twelve
feet deep and twelve feet broad. When the red mantle was hung before
the general�s tent each soldier said to himself, "Perhaps to-day I may
win the golden crown."  Laughing and jesting they rubbed their limbs
with oil, and took out of their cases the bright helmets and the
polished shields which they used only on the battle-day. As they stood
ready to advance upon the foe the general would address them in a
vigorous speech; he would tell them that the greatest honour which
could befall a Roman was to die for his country on the field, and that
glorious was the sorrow, enviable the woe of the matron who gave a
husband or a son to Rome. Then the trumpets pealed, and the soldiers
charged, first firing a volley of javelins and then coming to close
quarters with the solid steel. The chief fault of the Roman military
system at that time was in the arrangement of the chief command. There
were two commanders-in-chief, possessing equal powers, and it sometimes
happened that they were both present on the same spot, that they
commanded on alternate days, and that their tactics differed. They were
appointed only for the year, and when the term drew near its end a
consul would often fight a battle at a disadvantage, or negotiate a
premature peace, that he might prevent his successor from reaping the
fruits of his twelve month�s toil. The Carthaginian generals had
thereby an advantage, but they also were liable to be recalled when too
successful by the jealous and distrustful government at home." |
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