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| Timeline: The Third Punic War and After |
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BC |
Carthage & Rome: Treaties, Punic Wars, Hannibal |
Rome |
Other Events |
| 151 |
Carthage declares war on Masinissa and loses |
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Scipio Minor goes to Spain under L. Lucullus |
| 150 |
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c150BC The traveler Pausanius wrote a description of Greece which we have and it is, so to speak, the first guide book known. |
Achaean exiles/hostages returned to Greece - Polybius is no longer a political hostage of Rome |
| 149 |
Third Punic War begins (149-146BC) ; Romans invade Africa. Carthage besieged - Masinissa dies |
Lex Calpurnia repetundarum on extortion.
Lex Calpurnia: permanent court de repetundis with senatorial jurors
Publication of Cato's Origines |
The Fourth Macedonian War (149-148 BC). when Andriscus, pretender to the Macedonian throne causes unrest in Macedonia.
148/9 Sparta secedes from the Achaean League. |
| 148 |
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Poor performance by Roman army in Africa continues. |
Andriscus defeated by Rome.
The survivors of Galba's massacre in Spain revolted again, and captured
the territory of Turdetania. They chose Viriathus as leader. |
| 147 |
Scipio Aemilianus (adopted grandson of elder Scipio) given African command and tightens siege on Carthage. |
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Macedonia is annexed by Rome and is made a Roman province.
Roman envoy authorises the secession of several cities from the Achaean League. |
| 146 |
Scipio Aemilianus takes Carthage and destroys it. Third Punic War ends. |
After 146 prorogation of consuls and praetors becomes customary |
The Achaean War - the Achaean League defeated and dissolved; Corinth destroyed by Mummius. End of Greek independence |
| 143 |
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143-133 Third Celtiberian
War in Spain (Numantine War) Caecilius Metellus was sent to subdue
them. He was successful but didn't get to Numantia. |
| 141 |
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Pompeius bought peace
with the Celtiberian Numantia for 30 tons of silver. but the Senate
refused to acknowledge it (he kept the money). They replaced Pompeius
wiuth Popillius. |
| 140 |
First high level aquaduct, Aqua Marcia, built by A. Marcius Rex
L. Licinius Crassus born |
145 or 140 Gaius Laelius
proposes land redistribution to the needy to bring them up to property
qualification needed for legionary service and is blocked by
aristocracy |
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| 139 |
Lex Gabinia: secret ballot for elections to reduce intimidation of voters |
Independence of the Jewish state is recognized by Roman decree |
Popillius Laenas rejected
peace because Senate didn't ratify; silver not returned - The Romans
defeat the Celts in the Iberian Peninsula and found Lusitania |
| 138 |
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L. Sulla born |
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| 137 |
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Lex Cassia: secret ballot to the extortion court |
The consul C. Hostilius
Mancinus (with Tiberius Gracchus as quaestor) was then sent to make war
upon the Celtiberians. Surrender of C. Hostilius Mancinus at Numantia
in Spain. |
| 134 |
Outbreak of the First
Sicilian Slave War. Arises from brutality toward slaves in Sicily,
encompasses almost half of the island, and is put down only after
several
Roman losses |
Second consultate of P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus. |
Scipio Aemilianus sent to
Spain. Aemilius, like Lucullus before him, decided to attack the
Vaccaei (unsuccessfully) in search of loot and was fined. C. Marius
serves at Numantia under Scipio Minor. Siege of Numantia begins. |
| 133 |
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Tribune Tiberius Gracchus
reimposes the agrarian laws of Licinius Stolo. Deposition of tribune,
Marcus OctaviusSenators led by Scipio Nasica murder Gracchus and 300
supporters |
Scipio Aemilianus destroys Numantia. End of the Celtiberian War in Spain
- Rome gains Asia as a province
- Attalus III of Pergamum, who dies without heirs, bequeaths Pergamum to Rome |
| 132 |
Slave revolt in Sicily ends |
First Servile War |
132-130 Revolt in Asia of Aristonicus, illegitimate son of Eumenes II of Pergamum |
| 131 |
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Lex Papiria introduces secret ballot to legislative assemblies |
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| 129 |
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Scipio the Younger (P.
Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus Numantinus Minor) dies - probably
of poisoning because he opposed the Gracchi. |
Province of Asia organized from Pergamene kingdom. Defeat of Aristonicus to claim the throne of Attalus III |
Before the First Punic War | First Punic War | Between the First and Second Punic Wars | Second Punic War | Between the Second and Third Punic Wars | The Third Punic War and after (until the death of Scipio Aemilianus)
Various sources, including:
http://www.geocities.com/~stilicho/225.html
http://web.idirect.com/~atrium/rresources.html%20
The Third Punic War 149-146BC
This was very much an anticlimax. It was also an example of Roman brutality and imperial ambition at its worst.
Rome And Carthage After The War With Hannibal
Rome
and Carthage remained at peace with each other throughout the course of
the fifty years following the peace that was made in 201 at the end of
the Second Punic War.
The
Carthaginians quickly recovered their economic strength. In the 190s
Hannibal became active in domestic Carthaginian politics and seems to
have brought about the removal of a particularly corrupt set of
officials. In 195 the Romans, incited by Hannibal's Carthaginian
political opponents, forced the Carthaginians to exile him. Carthage's
state finances improved, something that was presumably helped by the
state's greatly reduced military burden (Carthage's mercenary army must
have been expensive).
Already
by 191 the Carthaginians offered to pay off at once the annual tribute
they owed as a war indemnity for the next forty years. (Since Carthage
owed 200 talents per year, the offer amounted to 8000 talents.) The
senate refused the offer, not wishing to allow the Carthaginians to
cease to be obligated to Rome. The same year the Carthaginians offered
a large amount of grain to help the Romans in their war in Greece. In
order to avoid any Roman obligation, the senate insisted on paying for
the grain. (In effect, the Romans were refusing to engage in the kind
of relationship involving the exchange of favors: if the Romans
accepted a favor from their subordinates the Carthaginians they would
in some sense be beholden to them. By paying money for the grain the
Romans made sure that the exchange was a purely monetary arrangement
that had no furtherimplications. This rather uncharactistic behavior
shows the extent of Roman dislike of the Carthaginians after the war
with Hannibal.)
Massinissa stirs up trouble
Roman Perfidy
A
pretext for destroying the city was not long wanting. In I50 B.C. the
Carthaginians, when Masinissa made another attack upon their territory,
instead of calling upon Rome, from which source experience had taught
them they could hope for neither aid nor justice, gathered an army with
the resolution of defending themselves. Their forces, however, were
defeated by the Numidians and sent beneath the yoke. On a hill near the
battle-field sat a young Roman officer, Scipio Aemilianus, the granson
by adoption of the man who had defeated Hannibal. He had been sent over
from Spain for a squadron of elephants, and arrived in Masinissa�s camp
at this interesting crisis. The news of the battle was soon despatched
by him to Rome.
In
entering upon this war Carthage had broken the conditions of the last
treaty. This Cato was the man on whom rests chiefly the destruction of
Carthage. In public and in private, by direct denunciation, by skilful
innuendo, by appealing to the fears of some and to the interests of
others, he laboured incessantly towards his end.
Cato and the Carthaginian figs
In
any case, Cato from now on was a determined advocate of war with
Carthage. Every time he gave his opinion in the senate, he ended with
the famous word ceterum censeo delendam esse Carthaginem ("Besides
which, my opinion is that Carthage must be destroyed"). Cato was
opposed by P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica, a collateral relation of the
family of Scipio Africanus. He apparently argued that without the
nearby danger of a serious enemy the Romans would grown weak. (An idea
already foreshadowed in the speech that Cato had given inopposition to
the proposal to declare war on Rhodes in 167.)
By the late 150s many senators were clearly looking for an excuse to attack Carthage.
It
would seem from Nasica's argument that the Romans genuinely felt some
concern about the threat of Carthage, but it is at the same time quite
clear that Carthage posed no serious threat to Rome. Nonetheless, there
was doubtless lingering hostility to the Carthaginians as a result of
the war with Hannibal (Cato certain had fought many years in that war).
Certainly,
there must have been the usual mid Republican desire to make a profit
from war booty. Carthage was still one of the largest cities in the
Mediterranean world, and if the legation of 153/2 was impressed with
the wealth of the Carthaginian hinterland, that was all the more reason
for magistrates to be eager for war. The soldiers too were favorably
inclined on these grounds. Whereas the Roman state had recently had
major problems in finding men willing to serve in the unremunerative
wars in Spain, when war came with Carthage there was no shortage of
volunteers.
It
appears to have been a general Roman policy at this time to act
aggressively with any power that had any semblance of independence (as
Rome's old ally Rhodes could attest).
Given
these propensities it is hardly surprising that the senate adopted a
more hostile attitude toward Carthage as the old treaty approached its
conclusion.
Beginning Of War
The
continued Roman support of Masinissa against Carthage led to the rise
to power in Carthage of a "democratic" government that was opposed to
the old oligarchy that had co-operated with the Romans. In 151, when
Masinissa besieged a Carthaginian town, the new government sent 25,000
troops to relieve it. As it turned out, the inexperienced Carthaginian
force was wiped out by Masinissa, but more importantly, the
Carthaginians had violated the provision of the peace treaty that they
not wage war without Roman consent.
For
some reason war was not declared in 150. Perhaps the year was already
advanced before the Romans were in a position to declare war (the force
sent to Carthage was to be unusually large) and they decided to wait
until the next year and let Carthage be weakened by Masinissa in the
meanwhile. Certainly, the senate gave unhelpful responses to two
Carthaginian embassies in 150 (basically they said the Carthaginians
knew what they had to do). It was so clear what was in the air that the
town of Utica made a deditio ("unconditional surrender") to Rome before
any hostilities started.
The
loss of Utica was a demonstration of the hopelessness of resistance, so
in 149 the Carthaginians sent envoys to Rome with the power to
surrender. When they got to Rome, they found that the Romans had
already declared war but were willing to accept a Carthaginian deditio
if the handed over 300 hostages from noble families and agreed to do
what the consuls said. In return the Carthaginians were guaranteed
their freedom, but the city of Carthage itself was not mentioned.
The senate, egged on by Cato, and having already made plans for such an occurrence, voted for war in 149 BC.
"When
the Carthaginians had been some time deliberating how they should meet
the message from Rome [an ultimatum to break up their army and navy]
they were reduced to a state of the utmost embarrassment by the people
of Utica anticipating their design by putting themselves under the
protection of Rome. This seemed their only hope of safety left: and
they imagined that such a step must win them favor at Rome: for to
submit to put themselves and their country under control was a thing
which they had never done even in their darkest hour of danger and
defeat, with the enemy at their very walls. And now they had lost all
the fruit of this resolve by being anticipated by the people of Utica;
for it would appear nothing novel or strange to the Romans if they only
did the same as that people. Accordingly, with a choice of two evils
only left, to accept war with courage or to surrender their
independence, after a long and anxious discussion held secretly in the
Senate-house, they appointed two ambassadors with plenary powers, and
instructed them, that, in view of the existing state of things, they
should do what seemed for the advantage of their country. The names of
these envoys were Gisco Strytanus, Hamilcar, Misdes, Gillimas, and
Mago. When they reached Rome from Carthage, they found war already
decreed and the generals actually started with their forces.
Circumstances, therefore, no longer giving them any power of
deliberating, they offered an unconditional surrender." (Polybius XXXVI)
The
Carthaginian senate, in great anxiety, now sent an embassy to Italy to
offer any reparation the Romans might demand. They were told that if
they would give three hundred hostages, children of the noblest
Carthaginian families, the independence of their city should be
respected. They eagerly complied with this demand.
But
no sooner were these hostages in the hands of the Romans than the two
consular armies - a total force of 80,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry,
thus secured against attack, crossed from Sicily into Africa, and
disembarked at Utica, only ten miles from Carthage. They demanded the
surrender of Carthaginian arms, and received 200,000 sets of armor and
2,000 catapults. Still hoping to win their enemy to clemency, they
complied with this demand also.
Now
they consuls made known the final demand that the senate had
intentionally withheld from the Carthaginian envoys in Rome. The
Carthaginians had to abandon the town itself for destruction and could
settle wherever they wanted in Carthaginian territory, provided that
the new site was at least ten miles from the sea. Such a move was
clearly impossible for a trading city, and the Carthaginians refused,
declaring war on the Romans.
When
this resolution of the Senate was announced to the Carthaginians and
they realized the baseness and perfidy of their enemy, a cry of
indignation and despair burst from the betrayed city. The effect was
that the desperate war party took control of the city of Carthage.
Moderate men, who had tried to save peace, were massacred together with
the Italian residents. A army was raised from the city itself and its
neighbouring towns and tribes. Meanwhile the Roman army, having allowed
the Carthaginians too much time to organize, was losing more men
through sickness (due to camping out in marshes) than it lost by
fighting the enemy.
At Nepheris as many as 70,000 African soldiers and civilians were killed, while 10,000 were captured and only 4,000 escaped.
The Carthaginians prepare to defend their City
The
Carthaginians once more proved that when push came to shove, they would
fight fiercely. It was resolved to resist to the bitter end the
execution of the cruel decree. The gates of the city were closed. They
made huge numbers of weapons (and presumably had not surrender
everything) and freed their slaves. Men, women, and children set to
work and labored day and night manufacturing arms. The entire city was
converted into one great workshop. The utensils of the home and the
sacred vessels of the temples, statues and vases, were melted down for
weapons. Material was torn from the buildings of the city for the
construction of military engines. The women cut off their hair and
braided it into strings for the catapults. By such labor and through
such sacrifices the city was soon put in a state to withstand a siege.
When
the Romans advanced to take possession of the place, they were
astonished to find the people they had just so treacherously disarmed,
with weapons in their hands, manning the walls of their capital and
ready to bid them defiance.
Surprisingly, the initial naval and ground operations went in favor of Carthage.
The
consuls of 149 were not very successful. They were not forceful in
prosecuting the war (apparently expecting that delay would make things
easier as the Carthaginians lost their initial enthusiam), though one
did temporarily breach Carthage's walls. The Carthaginians maintained
an army outside the walls, which made matters difficult for the Romans.
One consul returned to Rome at the end of the year to hold elections
and the other suffered losses in trying to find a base for his huge
force in the winter of 149/48. (The Romans had apparently not counted
on a major campaign, and even though a number of towns had gone over to
them, none were near Carthage. Hence, provision an army stationed in
the open was difficult.)
The
consul of the next year (148) was kept busy with attacks on various
towns around Carthage, though at the end of the year another ultimately
unsuccessful breach was made in the wall.
At
the consular elections for the next year, popular dissatisfaction with
the slow course of the campaign came to be felt. After two years of
blundering, Scipio Aemilianus was elected to be consul and commander in
Africa (147 BC). He was the son of one great Roman general (L. Aemilius
Paulus who destroyed the Macedonians at Pynda) and adopted grandson of
another (Scipio Africanus). Since the late 180s one had to hold
successively the offices of quaestor, praetor and consul, and the age
for the praetorship was set at 39 and for the consulship 42. Scipio was
underage and had not been praetor, so he was doubly debarred from
holding the consulship. Yet popular feeling ran so high, that the
senate arranged for the electoral law to be suspended in that year to
allow Aemilianus to become consul.
With
good leadership Roman victory was inevitable for Carthage was a mere
shadow of the power she had once been. In 147 Scipio spent much time
restoring discipline to the Roman army. He also secured his rear,
forcing the Carthaginian army in the field to withdraw into the city
(this allowed the Romans freedom of movement in the countryside).
Scipio made the blockade stringent by walling off the isthmus on which
the town lay. The northern suburbs of Carthage were soon occupied
without difficulty.
In
order to cut off Carthage totally he had a huge mole built to block the
entrance of their harbor (the work is estimated to have involved the
deposition of about 15,000 cubic meters of large rocks in the sea). The
Carthaginians cleverly built another exit for their harbor and
improvized a new fleet from old parts. Their efforts were not rewarded
because when the new fleet amazingly appear it did not immediately
attack the unprepared Roman fleet due to inexperience, allowing the
Romans to recover. In the actual battle three days later the Roman
fleet won.
The Destruction of Carthage (146 BC)
He
waited for winter to pass before he ordered an assault on the city. By
the spring of 146 Scipio felt that Carthage was ready to be taken. His
main attack was delivered on the harbour side, where he effected an
entrance in the face of a determined and ingenious resistance. After
the Romans captured the walls, the Carthaginians burned the streets
nearby. The Roman took permanent possession of the wall this time, and
now had to fight their way from the harbor district toward the citadel
(Byrsa). For six days and six nights the Romans were forced to take one
building after another. This sort of street fighting is virtually
unheard of in antiquity; once the walls were breached resistance was
pretty much hopeless and surrender followed. The continued Carthaginian
resolve is a measure of their desperation.
By
the seventh day the Romans reached the citadel and the Carthaginians
offered to come out voluntarily if their lives were spared. Scipio
agreed and 50,000 emerged. 900 Roman deserters refused to surrender and
with the Carthaginian commander Hasdrubal defended themselves in the
precinct of the largest and most opulent temple in Carthage (that of
Eshmoun). When they were forced onto the roof of the temple,
Hasdrubal's courage failed and he surrendered with his wife and two
children. The deserters asked for a moment's respite from Scipio, to
which he assented. After hurling abuse at Hasdrubal for cowardice they
set the temple on fire and died in the flames. Hasdrubal's wife then
called him a coward too and threw herself and her children into the
flames.
The
slaughter that accompanied the house to house fighting is perhaps the
greatest systematic execution of non-combatants before World War II. Of
a city population that may have exceeded seven hundred thousand, only
50,000 remained at the final surrender.
Although
Scipio Aemilianus sacked Carthage he wanted to spare the city further
destruction. The Roman Senate decreed otherwise, completely destroying
the city and selling some 50,000 citizens as slaves. The town was
stripped of its valuables and burned for ten days. The harbor and the
city were demolished. The land was then cursed (the story that it was
sown with salt is a later invention). Carthage ceased to exist.
Such
was the hard fate of Carthage. Polybius, who was an eyewitness of the
destruction of the city, records that Scipio, as he gazed upon the
smoldering ruins, seemed to read in them the fate of Rome, and,
bursting into tears, sadly repeated the lines of Homer:
The day shall be when holy Troy shall fall
And Priam, lord of spears, and Priam's folk [Iliad, vi. 448]
When
asked what he meant he said that he was worried that a similar event
might befall Rome, too. This moment is an odd indication of the
Hellenism of the mid Republic. Scipio can interpret what he is doing in
light of Greek literature. Yet he nonetheless oversees the destruction
of the city like a good Roman.
It
was decided to annex the territory of Carthage. A board of ten was
(unsually) elected to play the role of the senatorial legation of ten
to assist Scipio in this. Towns that had remained loyal to Carthage
were destroyed and those that had supported Rome were rewarded. A head
tax was assessed on all adults in the province and a form of tribute
based on land (stipendium) imposed (exceptions were made for the loyal
towns).
Scipio
returned to Rome and celebrated a triumph. Like his adoptive
grandfather he received the honorary title Africanus (hence he is
sometimes known as Africanus the Younger, though for convenience he is
generally called Scipio Aemilianus).
The
Carthaginian territory in Africa was made into a Roman province, with
Utica as the leading city. The year 146 thus saw the establishment of
two new provinces, Africa and Macedonia. On the last occasion when new
provinces had been created (in 195 for Spain), two new positions as
praetor were created to provide magistrates for these positions, but
this time the creation of two new provinces did not see an increase in
the number of praetors. This guaranteed that in any given year some
provinces would have to be governed by promagistrates. The reasons for
this refusal to increase the number of praetors is not known but can be
guessed at. The new positions created in 195 meant that there were six
praetors created for every two positions as consul. This resulted in
heightened competition for the consulship among the ex-praetors.
Raising the number of praetors to eight would have meant increasing the
number of disgruntled, frustrated ex-praetors seeking a consulship and
using any means at their disposal (including bribery) to gain office.
The needs of imperial administration and oligarchic harmony were coming
into conflict.
By
means of traders and settlers Roman civilization was spread rapidly
throughout the regions that lie between the ranges of the Atlas and the
sea. Numidia remained a free ally of Rome, but with Masinissa having
died, it was now in the hands of his three quarreling sons and hence
posed no threat. Tripolitania also came under Roman rule, but was
purposely kept separate from the African province.
The
fall of the Carthaginian empire is not a matter for regret. Outside the
walls of the city existed hopeless slavery on the part of the subject,
shameless extortion on the part of the officials. Throughout Africa
Carthage was never named without a curse. In the time of the mercenary
war the Moorish women, taking oath to keep nothing back, stripped off
their gold ornaments and brought them all to the men who were resisting
their oppressors. That city, that Carthage, fed like a vulture upon the
land. A corrupt and grasping aristocracy, a corrupt and turbulent
populace, divided between them the prey. The Carthaginian customs were
barbarous in the extreme. When a battle had been won they sacrificed
their handsomest prisoners to the gods; when a battle had been lost the
children of their noblest families were cast into the furnace. Their
Asiatic character was strongly marked. They were a people false and
sweet-worded, effeminate and cruel, tyrannical and servile, devout and
licentious, merciless in triumph, faint-hearted in danger, divinely
heroic in despair.
Let
us therefore admit that, as an imperial city, Carthage merited her
fate. But henceforth we must regard her from a different point of view.
In order to obtain peace she had given up her colonies abroad, her
provinces at home, her vessels and elephants of war. The empire was
reduced to a municipality. Nothing was left but the city and a piece of
ground. The merchant princes took off their crowns and went back into
the glass and purple business. It was only as a town of manufacture and
trade that Carthage continued to exist, and as such her existence was
of unmixed service to the world. (http://www.exclassics.org/martyrdom/martc18.htm)
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